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THE PRO AND CON OF INTERJECTING PLAINTIFF
INSURANCE COMPANIES IN JURY TRIAL CASES:
AN ISOLATED JURY PROJECT CASE STUDY
DALE W. BROEDER*

What follows is an abbreviated analysis of only one of a series
of twenty-three consecutively observed jury trials tried in a single
federal district court in the Midwest in the late 1950's. Originally,
the data which follow were intended to serve as a "jumping off

place" for a discussion of all facets of the twenty-three trials in
question. This proved impractical. However, since the case in question possessed more "insurance aspects" than any other case studied,
and since its "insurance aspects" are fully supported by additional
Jury Project data, it is felt that even a brief look at only this case
would be profitable.
Of course, this article was generated by what is now familiarly
known as the University of Chicago Jury Project.' The author's
own contribution to the Project was slight. It consisted mostly of
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio. The author is deeply indebted to Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., of the University of Chicago Law School for
his always sage advice and for his encouragement.
1. For other Jury Project data, see Kalven, Report on the Jury Project of the
University of Chicago Law School (Conference on Legal Research, Univ. of Mich.
Law School 1955) ; Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago
Law School, 24 Ins. L.J. 364 (1957). See also Meltzer, A Projected Study of the Jury
as a Working Institution, 287 Annals 97 (1953).
For this author's other published Jury Project work, see Broeder, The Impact of
Vicinage Requirement: An Empirical Look, 45 Neb. L. Rev. 99 (1966); Broeder,
Plaintiff's Family Status as Affecting Juror Behavior: Some Tentative Insights, 14 J.
Pub. L. 131 (1965) ; Broeder, Voir Dire Examination: An Empirical Study, 38 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 503 (1965) ; Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 Duke L.J. 19; Broeder, Previous Jury Trial Service Affecting Juror Behavior, 506 Ins. L.J. 138 (1965) (reprinted
by Matthew Bender in 1965 Personal Injury Journal) ; Broeder, University of Chicago
Jury Project, 38 Neb. L. Rev. 744 (1959) ; Broeder, The Jury Project, 26 S.D.B.J. 133
(1957) ; and Broeder, Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev.
386 (1954). See also Broeder, Jury, 13 Encyclopedia Britannica 205 (1963 ed.).
For other Jury Project publications, see Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, Delay in the
Courts (1959) ; Kalven, A General Analysis of and Introduction to the Problem of
Court Congestion and Delay, ABA Sect. Ins. N. & C. L. 322 (1963) ; Kalven, Zeisel &
Buchholz, Delay in the Court, 15 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 104 (1960) ; Kalven, Zeisel &
Buchholz, Delay in the Court, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23 (1959) ; Kalven, The Jury, the Law
and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 158 (1958), reprinted in
7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1958) ; Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Timesaving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1606 (1963) ; Zeisel, Splitting Liability and Damage
Issue Saves 20 Per Cent of the Court's Time, ABA Sect. Ins. N. & C. L. 328 (1963) ;
Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, Is the Trial Bar a Cause of Delayf, 43 J. Am. Jud.
Soc'y 17 (1959).
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the observation of the aforementioned twenty-three jury trials and
interviewing 225 jurors who served in them. The jurors were interviewed at their homes or places of business as soon as possible after
trial. The average juror interview lasted two and one-half hours.
Necessarily, the actual names of the parties, lawyers, jurors and
witnesses, as well as the location of the accident with which this
particular article is concerned, have been changed. 2
The case in question was tried twice, once in 1953, and again in
1956. The second trial was necessitated because the United States
Court of Appeals held that the first jury had inconsistently answered
certain defense interrogatories.
However, we are here concerned only with the second Phillips
trial. This trial produced a general verdict on behalf of the plaintiffs
in the form and amounts indicated below:
Joseph E. Phillips, Eastern Insurance Company, Transit Insurance Company,
Triangle Insurance Company, Richmond Insurance Company,
PLAINTIFFS
VS.

Robert Rogers, William Fox, East-West Express Company,
DEFENDANTS
We, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiffs and award damages as

follows:
1. To the Transit Insurance Company
(for damages to the tractor)
2. To the Triangle Insurance Company
(for damages to the trailer)
3. To the Eastern Insurance Company
(for workmen's compensation payment)
4. To the Richmond Insurance Company

$4,473.31
$ 449.64
$1,940.88
$1,421.50

(for damages to the cargo)

5.

TOTAL
To Joseph E. Phillips
a. For excess of damages to tractor over insurance
payment by the Transit Insurance Company
b. For excess of damages to trailer over insurance
payment by the Triangle Insurance Company
c. For excess of damage relating to personal
injuries over workmen's compensation insurance
payments by the Eastern Insurance Company
TOTAL:

$8,285.33
$1,450.
$ 350.
$18,000.

$19,800.

2. It should be noted, however, that all names and places referred to in the
author's various Jury Project articles, while fictitious, are nevertheless held constant.
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For the reader's convenience, a table indicating the background
characteristics of the Phillips II jurors will be found in the appendix.8 It should also be stressed that there are many facets of the
Phillips II case and that the primary concern here is with its "insurance aspects." Additional facets of the case are dealt with in the
author's other Jury Project publications.
I
THE ACCIDENT

The Phillips case was an action to recover for personal injuries
to the plaintiff, Joseph E. Phillips, and for damage to his tractor
and trailer and the cargo contained therein, resulting from a collision with a tractor-trailer unit operated by defendant William Fox
and owned by defendant East-West Express Company. Defendant
Robert Rogers was the operator of a 1948 Studebaker owned by his
wife, which was also involved in the accident. The plaintiff insur.
ance companies are involved because of payments made on account
of injuries to Phillips and damage to his vehicle and cargo. These
insurance companies were brought into the case as involuntary
party-plaintiffs. Their interests in the controversy (which are reflected in the verdict reproduced above) were made clear to the
jury at the outset of the trial.
The accident occurred on the night of February 28, 1951, one and
one-half miles west of Middletown, Ames, on U.S. Highway 97.
The highway, which runs in an east-west direction, was of concrete
and at the time consisted of three lanes, each ten feet wide. The
surface was straight and level at the accident scene and for a material distance in each direction. A dirt shoulder extended to the
north from three to seven feet and then sloped gradually to a ditch.
The south shoulder, which was covered with gravel, was thirty
inches wide and level.
At the time of the accident, the shoulders were crested with
snow. The highway was icy in spots and a freezing rain had begun
to fall a short time before. Defendant Rogers, while driving west,
had stopped to assist a woman whose car was in the ditch north of
the highway with its headlights shining up out of the ditch toward
the east or southeast. In doing so, he drove onto the north shoulder.
Because of the soft condition of the shoulder, and to avoid sliding
into the ditch, he accordingly left a portion of his automobile re3. Appendix, page 286 infra.
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maining on the pavement. Approximately one foot of the outside
lane was obstructed by Rogers' car. Rogers testified that when he
stopped all of his lights were on and that although he did not know
how far to the rear the taillights were visible, he thought one should
have been able to see them for "at least a city block or about 400
feet maybe."
While the Rogers car was parked partly on the highway, defendant Fox, driving a tractor and trailer, approached the scene from
the east travelling in the outside lane. Plaintiff Phillips, driving in
the southernmost lane, approached from the left. The center lane remained clear. Both vehicles were traveling at a moderate rate of
speed. Fox saw the headlights of Phillips' tractor and also those
of the automobile in the ditch north of the highway. The lights
from the automobile in the ditch were "very bright." Fox testified
that although he was not blinded by these lights, he could not see
the automobile behind the lights. He stated that he did not see the
Rogers' car until he was within ten or fifteen feet of where it was
parked. He then swerved to the left in an effort to avoid a collision, but the tractor struck the Rogers automobile on the left
side. Fox's vehicle then went out of control, glanced diagonally
across the highway toward the south shoulder and into the path of
the tractor-trailer driven by Phillips.
As Phillips approached from the west he observed the headlights of Fox's tractor. He likewise noticed the lights of the car in
the ditch on the north and saw Rogers' car parked along side. He reduced speed, intending to stop. It appeared that there had been
an accident and he wished to see whether there was anything he
could do. Phillips was nearly upon the scene when Fox's tractor
struck the parked automobile and shot across the road directly
in his path. Phillips had no opportunity to avoid a collision and his
tractor struck the right side of the Fox tractor-trailer. The collision resulted in the injuries and damage complained of.
The plaintiffs alleged that defendant Fox was negligent in failing to maintain a proper lookout, in failing to have his tractortrailer under control and in failing to avoid the collision with Rogers'
car. The plaintiffs further alleged that defendant Rogers was negligent in parking his vehicle on a portion of the roadway and in failing to have his lights lighted. The defendants denied any negligence
and asserted the plaintiff's contributory negligence. While the jury
was instructed on contributory negligence in the first trial, the court
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refused to do so in the second, ruling that plaintiff Phillips was free
from contributory negligence as a matter of law.
II
THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFF: JOSEPH E. PHILLIPS

A.

The Jurors'Reactions in General
While many of the Phillips II jurors did not have very strong
feelings about Joe one way or the other, enough was said to suggest the existence of a relationship between such feelings as they did
have and the way they felt about liability and damage questions.
Thus, the defendant-prone juror trio of Stillman, Ring and Butz
was wholly unsympathetic. Stillman described Joe as "an ignorant
workman trying to take the insurance company for a fast buck."
Joe reminded Stillman of some of his own employee-troublemakers,
"always complaining, always exaggerating their on-the-job injuries,
always trying to get something they're not justly entitled to."
Mrs. Ring "didn't like . . . Joe at all . . . He took the witness
stand and perjured himself [about] . . . the extent of his injuries. He seemed like a dumb truck driver." Other than remarking
that Joe exaggerated the extent of his injuries, however, Mrs. Ring
would not talk about him during her personal interview, although
she clearly aligned herself with her defendant-prone colleagues by
squinting her face as a sign of general disapproval and lack of
sympathy.
But the jurors favoring damages in excess of $15,000 expressed
strikingly different sentiments. For them, Joe was a "good guy,"
"honest, sincere, conscientious and hardworking," "a fellow who
does all he can to provide a decent living for his family." Juror
Scott's (over $25,000) remarks were typical: "I was greatly impressed by him. I liked his demeanor. I thought he was very straightforward and honest . . . I also think that he is probably a good
workman and that he does all he can to provide a good living for
his family."
Mrs. Martin ($18,000-$20,000), Mr. Garland ($20,000$25,000), and Mrs. Adler (over $20,000), all of whom felt "very
sorry for him," went further, glimpsing reflections of what they
saw as Joe's above-average intelligence and sensitivity. He was certainly "not just an ordinary truck driver." Indeed, to hear Mrs.
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Martin and Mrs. Adler talk, one would have thought him a genius.
Mr. Helmut (over $25,000) and Mrs. Landon ($18,000) were
also very impressed. None of the jurors whose "personal awards"
were in excess of $15,000 thought that any of Joe's testimony was
biased.
Mrs. Bonham ($5000) took a stand midway between the prodefendant and pro-plaintiff groups, seeing Joe as an "ordinary truck
driver . . . not very intelligent . . . and inclined to exaggerate
• . . his injuries. [Yet] . . . he seemed to be reasonably honest
. . . [and] more or less of a family man. But he was sloppy. He
never dressed up during the trial. I didn't feel sorry for him at all."
Foreman Barker ($7500) echoed these sentiments. Mr. Smith,
($10,000), however, took a view very close to Mrs. Adler, describing Joe as a "higher-type individual," "much better than an
ordinary truck driver."
B. Phillips'Family Status
If Joe had been a bachelor, there seems no doubt that the case
would have gone differently. But Joe was "a family man," a "hard
worker," a "good provider." And his family, this wife and young
boy, had to be taken care of. "And what would happen to them if
Mr. Phillips lost his job or had to have an operation?" Helmut,
Scott, Adler and Garland made the argument during the deliberations and it went unchallenged, and with reason. For it was obvious
that family life, family solidarity and security ranked high in the
values of all Phillips II jurors.
Unfortunately, the data available on the influence of Joe's family
on the jurors' behavior, while considerable, is not complete. However, it is known that six jurors-Stillman, Ring, Butz, Bonham,
Barker and Martin-who were more or less "defendant-prone,"
never adverted to the subject in the juryroom.
Of the remaining six jurors, all of whom favored a large (over
$18,000) damage award, juror Scott was probably the most strongly influenced by Joe's family and by what he felt was the necessity
of awarding enough to take care of them. Scott's unusually strong
feelings were closely bound up with sympathy for the economic
plight of his nephew's family resulting from the nephew's illness. But
the other five jurors were also influenced to award large damages
out of sympathy for the situation in which the family might find
itself if Joe could no longer work. Their uniform query regarding
"what the family would do if he lost his job or had to submit to an
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operation" leaves very little doubt about this, especially as the matter was not specifically investigated.
C.

Phillips' Ability To Withstand Loss
Joe was not a rich man but had considerable insurance protection.
He received weekly unemployment compensation insurance payments of $30 immediately after the accident, and there were $250deductible collision insurance policies on both his tractor and trailer,
as well as the workmen's compensation insurance which netted him
a lump sum payment of nearly $2000. Did such insurance protection
help or hurt him?
III

THE JUROR'S REACTIONS TO THE PLAINTIFF'S WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION SETTLEMENT

Did the jurors' knowledge of Joe's insurance protection, described in Section II-C supra, help or hurt him? The answer is clear
regarding the unemployment compensation payments. None of the
jurors considered them for the purpose of making a deduction from
the loss of wages Joe was entitled to recover. They were completely
ignored for this purpose, not only in the deliberations proper, but
in the jurors' private thinking as well. Mrs. Adler was the only
juror who thought of the payments in any connection whatever.
Mrs. Adler remembered that Joe had not received any unemployment compensation payments while out of work immediately following the accident (as, of course, he did) and felt that the absence of
such payments for such period meant that he was "dogging it" at
that time and should not therefore receive any reimbursement for
his current wage losses. However, Mrs. Adler failed to advance
this argument during the deliberations. All things considered, it
seems apparent that the failure of plaintiffs' counsel to avail themselves of the collateral benefits rule 4 to keep out evidence that Joe
received unemployment compensation benefits was almost wholly
immaterial.
.It
is almost certain, too, that Joe's receipt of a workmen's compensation insurance settlement of nearly $2000 failed to affect him
adversely. Indeed, it seems to have had an opposite effect. For while
all of the jurors were aware that Joe had been paid $2000-and to
4. See generally Gregory & Kalven, Cases and Materials on Torts 476-83 (1959).
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that extent had already been compensated for his injuries-all but
five jurors stated that they did not seriously consider the payment
from this standpoint and that its effect in reducing damages was
remote. So far as these seven jurors were concerned, the major
effect of the $2000 payment was to convince them that Joe was
seriously injured. This was because they felt workmen's compensation notoriously inadequate and that an award as large as $2000
could only mean that a "Board of Experts" had determined that
Joe was seriously injured. Nor was any juror's reasoning in this
fashion deterred, for they knew nothing of the proceedings before
"the Board," knew nothing of the basis such "Board" used in arriving at the $2000 figure, and plaintiff's counsel failed to haul the
"experts" into court. In this connection, it is interesting that the
question of whether the above argument should be advanced to the
jury had been discussed at length among Phillips' counsel, having
been earnestly pressed by a young associate of plaintiff's lawyer
Goldberg. Plaintiff's lawyer Roth, however, finally decided against
it, desiring to avoid an almost certain interruption from defense
counsel. And, as things turned out, his choice proved correct; the
jurors thought of the argument by themselves.
Of course, not all of the jurors agreed with the argument. Stillman and Ring thought "it was just plain silly." Nor did Barker,
Bonham and Smith approve. These jurors could only see that Joe had
already received $2000, and that this was a good reason for holding
down damages. Such sentiments, however, did not prevail for the
jury as a whole.
IV
THE JUROR'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTERESTS OF THE
PLAINTIFF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND ITS EFFECT
ON THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE AWARD

Aside from the damage-increasing effect of the compensation
insurance settlement described in Section III supra, there is reason to
believe that the jurors' knowledge of the interests of all the plaintiff
insurance companies increased damages. This, it should be noted,
was the theory of Phillips' counsel. For while Joe's lawyers vigorously opposed the defendants' motion to join the plaintiff insurance
companies as involuntary party-plaintiffs, they soon experienced a
change of heart and made no attempt to prevent defendants from
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referring to the insurance companies during the trial, even though
their chances for success were excellent. They soon became convinced that Joe's personal award would be larger if the interests of
the insurance companies were fully disclosed.
The wisdom of such strategy can best be determined by considering what the situation would have been if the insurance companies'
interests had not been disclosed. There would be the ever-present
danger that defense counsel might obscure the plaintiff's case by
oblique references to "the real parties involved in the case," from
which the jury would infer that Joe would not receive any benefits
from a verdict in his behalf. But, assuming that the jury actually believed that Joe would personally benefit from every cent awarded,
what was "only adequate compensation" in his lawyers' eyes might
seem to the jury too much money for a single individual. Especially
would this be true if the jury was not required to make separate
awards for each of the various elements of damages.
Counsel for the plaintiffs reasoned that selling the jury on large
damages was just like selling anything else-if the "costs" could
be separated it would seem that less money was changing hands.
Itemization of the various elements of damages might help, but it
would be more helpful if the amounts paid by the insurance companies were divorced from Joe's personal award altogether. And
bringing the insurance payments into the open would have the added
advantage of ensuring that any award would minimally cover the
insurance company payments plus Joe's out-of-pocket property
damages not covered by insurance. Finally, the very fact that the
insurance payments were so large could itself be expected to have
the effect of increasing the amount of Joe's take-home award, for
after being forced to pay the insurance companies, the jury would
consider themselves pikers unless they gave Joe a substantial sum.
During the interviews, each juror was asked his opinion "on the
strategy of the defendants' lawyers in bringing the insurance companies into the case. Did it have any effect on the amount of damages
the jury awarded to Mr. Phillips?" If a juror said anything at all,
he was encouraged to discuss the matter fully. If not, the subject
was dropped.
The results are interesting. Five jurors-Adler, Butz, Smith, Helmut and Scott-said they had no opinion, though two, Adler and
Butz, expressed surprise in learning that the defendants' lawyers
were responsible for the companies' presence ! They were under the
impression that Joe's counsel were responsible, but when pressed on
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this point they could not (or at least would not) explain what had
given them this impression. However, four of the remaining jurorsRing, Garland, Barker, and Bonham-were certain that the presence
of the insurance companies caused the damages to be larger than they
would have been if the companies' interests had not appeared and
it had looked as if Phillips would receive all damages awarded.
This is true even though Ring and Bonham, like Adler and Butz,
thought that Joe's rather than defendants' counsel were responsible
for the insurance companies' presence.
Nevertheless, these four jurors all subscribed to the notion privately expressed by Joe's counsel that $30,000 would probably have
seemed "like too much money," though none of the jurors ventured
to state what the verdict might have been in such a case, or even
what he (as an individual) would have done. In discussing the matter, each of these four jurors made some reference to the rapidity
with which the stipulated damages had been assessed. "Those damages were automatic and when we reached the personal injury damages we ignored the fact that we had already given a lot of money."
Stillman and Landon flatly disagreed, stating that some of the
jurors were undoubtedly prejudiced against Joe's claims because of
the presence of the insurance companies. While Landon denied that
her thinking had been thus affected, Stillman freely admitted that
his had been.
Mrs. Martin's response is more interesting, however. It shows the
risk inherent in disclosing the insurance companies' interests (a matter discussed below) and it sheds light on the validity of the plaintiff's theory that the jurors would feel like pikers unless they awarded Phillips substantial damages after paying the insurance companies. Certainly Mrs. Martin so viewed the situation. The only
other juror making a similar comment was Mrs. Bonham: "I think
we awarded more damages because of the presence of the insurance
companies than we otherwise would . . . We really began with our
verdict just as if that initial $7,000 or $8,000, whatever it was,
had never been involved. And when you have already awarded that
much to insurance companies, you have to give the individual something, too."
Aside from this, the point that the presence of the insurance
companies probably increased rather than reduced damages seems
justified. Thus all jurors, regardless of their views about the effect
of the insurance companies' presence in raising Joe's damages,
clearly regarded Joe as "The Plaintiff," as if he were the only one.
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The question was whether Joe should recover and how much, not
whether the insurance companies should.
But what might have happened? There was a risk attached to
disclosing the insurance company interests. As viewed by plaintiff's counsel, the risk was that the jurors might be so distressed with
awarding substantial damages to the companies before they could
award anything to Phillips (assuming they would want to) that
they might find for defendants. This was why the plaintiff's counsel
originally opposed defendants' motion to join the companies as involuntary party-plaintiffs. And, essentially, there is no doubt that
their view was correct. Such risk, as it turned out, was present at all
times. And it almost materialized.
But there is much more to the story than simple juror prejudice
against plaintiff insurance companies. It is also a story about the nature and size of the insurance companies' damages, the damage value
of Joe's injuries, misunderstanding of the term "negligence," and
Fox's family and his reputation as a truck driver, to mention only the
more significant factors. It is chiefly in terms of these apparently disconnected considerations that the net risk of informing the jurors of
the insurance companies' interests must be determined.
The extent to which the jurors regarded Joe as the plaintiff and
the insurance companies as but hangers-on has already been noted.
However, certain jurors, among them three of the four persons
originally siding with defendants, were also acutely conscious of
the fact that a verdict for Joe would automatically entail a large
damage award to the insurance company plaintiffs. Mrs. Bonham's
above-quoted comment is illustrative but her view was even more
clearly articulated by Mrs. Ring: "[T]he insurance payments and
property damages which had to be awarded if I favored plaintiffs
were just too large in relation to the hairline nature of the case.
Those damages were automatic, even before you turned to his personal injuries." Mrs. Butz and Stillman expressed a similar view.
Two points are involved. The first is that the jurors in general,
and probably Martin, Ring, Butz and Stillman in particular, had
no sympathy because the insurance companies were required to pay
large damages, and Phillips was the only plaintiff whose damages
were worth considering. The second point is that at least Martin,
Ring and Butz were extremely concerned with the "automatic" nature of the insurance company damages and thought them "extremely large." By "automatic" was meant that they were stipulated property damages. If liability was conceded there would be
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no room for compromise later on. The phrase "exeremely large,"
however, was employed in different senses by these jurors. Mrs.
Martin used the term in its absolute sense; $8,000 was simply a lot
of money. But Butz and Ring meant large not so much as to amount
(though they also were worried about this), but large in relation to
the amount of damages they felt Joe was entitled to by reason of his
injuries.
And this is where the money-damage value of Joe's injuries was
significant, for, with the exception of Mrs. Martin, the jurors originally siding with the defendants all thought that very little, if anything, was seriously wrong with Joe, and that the only parties who
would benefit from a liability-finding were the insurance companies,
about which, as previously noted, these jurors cared nothing.
Another factor shaping the risk of informing the jurors of the
plaintiff insurance company interests was sympathy for Fox. His
reputation as a truck driver must be considered. A young man with
a wife and children to support cannot have a black mark on his driving record. This consideration seems to have weighed heavily with
Butz and Ring; for Stillman and Martin it was not as important.
The final major consideration involved was the nature of Fox's
"negligence." He was not charged with anything reckless, like
speeding or driving through a red light, but with having made a
simple mistake in judgement, by failing to notice a parked car which,
as a matter of fact, he had no reason to anticipate. And so far as
Ring, Martin and Butz were concerned, negligence was a question of
degree. You could be "slightly negligent" and still not be held liable.
These three jurors all referred to the "slight degree" to which Fox
was negligent and to the "hairline nature of the case." A related
notion, which was clearly expressed only by Mrs. Martin, but
which probably influenced Mrs. Ring also, was that a given degree
of negligence should occasion only limited damage consequences,
and that Fox had not been "negligent enough" to warrant the imposition of the damages required by reason of the insurance company payments: "After all, Fox was only slightly negligent and those
insurance companies had paid over a lot of money. But if the payments had not been so large and there had not been Mr. Phillips to
worry about . . . I would have voted differently. If only a total of
three or four thousand dollars had been involved, there would have
been no question of liability so far as I was concerned."
Juror Stillman, however, emphasized that Fox had not been
negligent and Stillman clearly understood the legal meaning of
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"negligence." Of the various other factors mentioned, Stillman admitted being influenced only by a "slight concern" over Fox's reputation as a truck driver, by the fact that Phillips had "already been
paid off," and by what he felt to be the minor nature of Phillips'
personal injuries. However, Stillman cared nothing about the interests of Phillips' insurance companies.
In summary, then, the four jurors originally siding with Fox
viewed the question of "liability" as an equation in which their
feeling that Phillips' insurance companies were unimportant was
only one significant factor on the defendant's side. This feeling,
however, was complimented by other considerations also thought to
militate against recovery. First, the insurance company damages
were stipulated and a liability finding necessarily entailed an award
for such amount. And damages were large both absolutely and in
relation to the amount of damages three jurors felt Philips should
recover. So far as Stillman, Butz and Ring were concerned, nothing
was seriously wrong with Joe. Accordingly, his net-damage award
(after lawyer's fees) would not be large and plaintiff insurance companies would be the ones primarily benefitting. And the companies,
of course, were unimportant. It was their business to absorb losses
just as they reaped profits from their policyholders' premiums.
Mrs. Martin's thinking is an interesting variation on that of the
other three jurors. Not that she cared more about the insurance
companies having to pay; indeed, she could not have cared less. But
she was extremely concerned with the total damages the defendant
(or its insurance company) would have to pay if liability were
determined because of her feeling that a certain degree of negligence
should result in a limited amount of damage-consequences. While
she was willing to award plenty to Phillips, she did not want to
award large damages to the insurance companies because this would
make the total award unjustifiably high. Yet she had to do so in
order to give Joe anything. It was a dilemma and she originally resolved it by voting "no liability." Of course, additional considerations
likewise affected her decision.
When the question of liability is viewed as an equation in which
pro-defendant factors form one side and the pro-plaintiff factors the
other, and the factors chosen for inclusion are those above mentioned, a verdict for defendants should result. This is not unreasonable, either, except in terms of the legal straitjacket we use to
contain juror thinking in traditional channels. On the contrary, the
"plus-minus" approach seems eminently well constructed and thought
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out. So much so, in fact, that it is probably a reliable juror-behavior
rule by which to assess the risk of informing jurors of plaintiff-insurance company interests in similar cases. If one of the pro-defendant factors is weakened or eliminated, or if a pro-plaintiff factor is
strengthened, the risk involved is reduced.
Thus, if the insurance company damages are unliquidated instead
of liquidated; or if the insurance company damages tend to be
smaller (rather than larger) in relation to what a jury is likely to
feel the policyholder-plaintiff is entitled to for his non-insurance
covered losses; or if the defendant or the defendant's employee (like
Fox) tends to be a bad man instead of a good one; or if the act
of negligence relied upon is more, rather than less, culpable, the
chances for a defendant's verdict are reduced. It is obvious, of
course, that the one constant in the equation is juror feeling against
recovery by insurance company subrogees hanging on to their policyholders' coattails.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the defendant's side of the
equation is strengthened, that the policyholder is unable to show
himself entitled to large damages (in relation to insurance company
damages)-his medical case is weaker than in the second Phillips
trial-the chances for a defendant's verdict are then enhanced. This,
it is felt, is the basic explanation for the difference in verdicts in the
two Phillips trials. In the first trial, Joe's attorneys did not demolish
the defendant's chief medical witness and show him to be a cross
between a fool and a liar. Nor was it shown in the first trial that Joe
might have to undergo a costly and painful spinal fusion operation.
Nor had he yet developed his traumatic neurosis condition, or been
forced to go to the hospital on account of his nerves. Thus, even
though the medical testimony in the second trial was (by the writer's
standards) none too strong, it was even more flimsy in the first. In
all other important respects, however, the two trials were identical.
V
THE INSURANCE COMPANIES AS INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS

As the "peculiar characteristics" of the insurance company plaintiffs affected Phillips' damage claim, they have already been considered in detail. However, as the point of view of the previous discussion was the effect of the jurors' knowledge of Joe's insurance
protection on Joe's claim, a few remarks are in order concerning the
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effect of these "peculiar characteristics" on the companies' own
claims.
First, as things actually turned out, the insurance companies were
in no worse position for having been brought into the open. Of
course, they ran the risk, as Joe did, of receiving nothing and, as
one-third of the jury originally took such a stand, three of them
retaining it for some time, the risk was substantial. So far as is
known, however, the manner in which the insurance company plaintiffs were dragged into the case-by defendants' motion to join
them as involuntary parties-did not adversely affect their interests, or Joe's either, for that matter, in the only way that it conceivably might have. For according to Garland, Ring, Scott and
Stillman, who were the only jurors questioned on the subject, no
juror even considered that the companies had originally refused
to sue because they thought the chances for success poor and that the
defendants were not liable.
Informing the jury of the plaintiff insurance company interests
in a suit by Phillips, of course, was not nearly as risky as direct
actions by such companies, at least if the theory of juror behavior
above outlined is accepted. At the same time, such disclosure was
certainly not as attractive to the companies as remaining in the
background to collect out of Joe's damage award.
The insurance company making the workmen's compensation payment stands on somewhat different footing in this regard, but it
seems probable that any award also would have been sufficient to
cover its loss. Of course, the insurance company carrying the policy
on the cargo could not have kept itself from view unless Phillips'
employer had seen fit to sue. In a suit between Joe and the defendants it would obviously be impossible to give the impression that
the cargo really belonged to Joe.
VI
THE DEFENDANTS

J. Robert Rogers
Robert Rogers-"good Samaritan," "Korean War veteran,"
"hard-working," "conscientious and forthright,"-really never came
close to being held liable. Thus, little would be gained by making a
detailed consideration of the jurors' reactions to his personality,
background, ability to pay and similar factors. Needless to say,
Bob was a popular defendant and jurors regarded him highly.
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The only point worth noting is that as late as the outset of the
Phillips deliberations, at least five jurors were more or less inclined
to hold this "good Samaritan" liable. Adler, Bonham, and Landon
were less inclined, but Garland and Helmut seemed positively eager.
This is interesting because seldom does an individual motorist def endant possess a "better case," not only from the viewpoint of his
own individual equities-Bob's chief one, of course, was trying to
assist a thankless damsel in distress-but from a legal view.
The attitudes of these aforementioned five jurors were in significant part attributable to pre-trial legal misconceptions with reference to parking on the highway. But this is simply the beginning.
For, by their own admissions, such jurors were also considerably influenced by a feeling that Rogers was insured. Indeed, the latter
consideration was more significant than the former. For these jurors
all agreed that they would "never have considered" the possibility
of finding Rogers negligent if they thought he was uninsured. Interestingly enough, however, the possibility that Rogers' insurance
coverage might not have reached $25,000 never occurred to them.
B.

William Fox
The jurors were even more favorably impressed by Fox than with
Rogers. Fox was "honest," "forthright, conscientious and hardworking." He "wasn't the kind to run around," "didn't seem like the
truck driver type at all." He "was neat and well-dressed throughout
the trial." These were typical comments. No one had a bad word
to say. All was praise-and sympathy.
Sympathy because the jurors-all of them save Garland (who
felt that Fox wanted Joe to recover)- thought that Fox's reputation as a truck driver was at stake. The impact of this consideration
upon the thinking of the four jurors originally voting against liability has already been noted. But it was a consideration affecting the
thinking of all jurors save Garland. Of course, it was not Fox's driving record in a vacuum that was involved but the effect that a "black
mark" would have upon his earning power. What would his family
do if he lost his job? After all, he had a wife and three children
to support. Similar thinking seems to have taken place in the minds
of the jurors in the first trial.
However, no juror was of the opinion that Fox might have to
pay damages out of his own pocket. Indeed, this possibility never
occurred to any juror. Even more striking is the fact, that, with the
exception of Scott and Garland, no juror paused to consider why Fox
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was joined as a defendant. And Garland and Scott "merely wondered about it." They did not conclude anything and certainly could
not have "wondered" very much. Fox's defendant status, if it was
thought of at all, was simply regarded as "normal" negligence-case
procedure.
Thus there was really no "ability-to-pay" problem so far as Fox
was concerned. The jurors simply assumed that Fox's employer
was insured and that his insurance company. would pay whatever
damages were awarded.
However, in order to determine the effect which would have been
created had the jurors felt that Fox might possibly be required to
pay part of the judgement, and to shed some light on the subject
of how defense paying ability is likely to affect the size of plaintiff's
damages, a questionnaire was distributed to the jurors by mail
shortly after the interviews.
The answers obtained from the eleven jurors responding are presented below in the second column of a two-column table, the first
column showing "what verdict (the juror) would have rendered if it
was entirely up to (him)." The jurors' "personal verdicts," of
course, were secured during the interviews and given on the assumption that Fox would not have to pay any part of the judgment.

NAME

Mrs. Ring
Mrs. Butz
Mr. Stillman
Mrs. Bonham
Mrs. Landon
Mrs. Adler
Mr. Garland
Mr. Scott
Mr. Helmut
Mrs. Martin
Mr. Smith
Mr. Barker

If entirely up to juror on
assumption Fox would not
have to pay anything

voted not liable
voted not liable
voted not liable

If entirely up to juror on
assumption Fox would
have to pay some part of
judgment

voted not liable
voted not liable
voted not liable

over $20,000

$3,000-5,000
voted not liable
$10,000-15,000

$20,000-25,000

voted not liable

over $25,000
over $25,000

$10,000-15,000

$5,000
$18,000

$18,000-20,000
$10,000
$7,500

voted not liable
$10,000-15,000

$5,000-10,000
no reply

Obviously the juror's assumption that Fox would not have to pay
had a significant effect upon their thinking. Three of the jurorsGarland, Landon and Helmut, who "personally" favored award-
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ing "over $25,000," "$18,000," and "over $25,000" respectivelywould have completely reversed themselves if they had thought Fox
would have to pay. The Helmut and Garland reversals are particularly significant, for these two men were extremely popular with
their fellow jurors and, along with Scott, were principally responsible for Phillips' $19,800 award. If Garland and Helmut had
taken the position that Fox was not liable, perhaps a defendants'
verdict would have resulted.
While the other juors originally siding with Phillips would not
have completely reversed themselves if they thought Fox would have
to pay, all would have favored less damages than they actually did.

APPENDI

List of Selected Characteristics c

Name
Mrs. Ring

Age
45-54

Sex
F

Race
White

Religion
Cong.

Attend
Church
Regularly
No

Mrs. Butz

25-34

F

White

Prot.

No

Ind.

M

0

Mr. Stillman

35-44

M

White

-

-

Ohio

M

4

Mrs. Bonham

35-44

F

White

Presby.

Yes

Chgo.

M

2

Mrs. Landon

45-54

F

White

Yes

Ohio

M

2

Mrs. Adler

45-54

F

White

Roman
Cath.
Prot.

Yes

Ohio

M

1

Mr. Garland

45-54

M

White

Episc.

Yes

Chgo.

M

1

Mr. Scott

35-44

M

White

Prot.

Yes

Ohio

M

1

Mr. Helmut

45-54

M

White

Prot.

No

Ohio

M

1

Mrs. Martin

55-64

F

White

Prot.

Yes

Ohio

M

2

Mr. Smith

55-64

M

White

Prot.

Yes

Ohio

M

I

Mr. Barker

25-34

M

White

?

?

?

M

1

Birth
Place
Ohio

Mar.
Stat.
M

No. of
Children
1
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East-West Express Co., Inc. (Fox's Employer)
Nothing is known about the jurors' feelings with reference to
Fox's employer except that everyone assumed that it was insured
and that the damages would be paid by an insurance company. Unfortunately, no attempt was made to determine what, if any, difference it would have made had the jurors thought that the company in question was self-insured.
A formalized conclusion will be forgone. This article's purpose
will be well served if the reader has gained only a few additional
insights concerning the jury.
C.

rurors in the Second Phillips Trial:

Education
4 yrs.
Coll.

3
3
3
2
3

Present
Occupation
H.W.

Past
Occupation
H.W.

31. yr.
Coll.

H.W.

4 yrs.
H.S.
2 yrs.
H.S.
8 yrs.
G.S.
4 yrs.
H.S.

Mgr. Wrecking Co.
H.W.

Gen. Off.

H.W.

Sec.

H.W.

H.W.

4 yrs.
H.S.
8 yrs.
G.S.
8 yrs.
G.S.
4 yrs.
H.S.
4 yrs.
Coll.

Typist

Br. Mgr.
Finance Co.
Auto
Dlr.
Owner
Mfg. Plant
Sec.

Asst.
Mgr.
Auto &
Svc. Mgr.
Mechanic

Farmer

Mech.

Ins.
Slsmn.

Prof.
Football
Player

H.W. Sec.

Spouse's
Individual
Occupation
Income
Physician
10,000
& over
Elem.
4,000
Teacher
4,999
H.W.
4,000
4,999
Banker
10,000
& over
Serv. Mgr.
?
Roy. Typ.

Family
Income
10,000
& over
4,000
4,999

Political
Affiliation
Democrat
Either
Republicai
Republicai

4,000
4,999

Republicai
Republicat

Farmer
Sec.
Cashier
H.W.
Supr. in
Aircraft
Bookpr.
H.W.

6,000
6,999
10,000
& over
7,000
9,999
Less than
2,000
2,000
3,999

7,000
9,000
10,000
& over

Democrat
Republicar
Republicar

2,000
3,999
4,000
4,999

Republican

